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One consequence of the Global Financial Crisis has been to prompt debate over 
macroprudential regulation – meant to limit private risk-taking that threatens systemic 
stability. In this paper, we stress the roots of macroprudential ideas in the Institutionalist 
economics of Veblen and Galbraith in a way that highlights both unrecognized policy 
possibilities and underappreciated impediments to policy effectiveness, arguing in 
particular that regulatory success can breed overconfidence. First, we argue that while 
Veblen’s views anticipated macroprudential arguments, they also obscured tensions 
between the technocratic acumen of policy ‘engineers’ and popular legitimacy. Secondly, 
we argue that while Galbraith’s views similarly shaped the postwar Keynesian policy 
mix, they also echoed Veblen in underrating the potential for populist resentment of an 
intellectual ‘technostructure’. We conclude that while this analysis can be seen as 
highlighting an overlooked century of macroprudential debate, it also demonstrates the 
potential for technocratic overconfidence – which can eventually undermine policy 
legitimacy and effectiveness.  
 
 1 
Introduction and Overview  
In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, ideas justifying ‘macroprudential 
regulation,’ that were intended to prevent private choices from threatening systemic 
instability, rose to prominence in a remarkably short period of time (Borio 2011; Baker 
2012).
1
 Building macroprudential regulation has become an accepted priority in most 
major financial centres. New agencies for the evaluation of systemic risk have been 
created in the form of the Financial Stability Oversight Council in the US, the European 
Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) in Europe and the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) in the 
UK. Concerted efforts are currently underway amongst the international community of 
central bankers and regulators to construct functioning macroprudential policy regimes. 
Key macroprudential concepts such as procyclicality, herding and fallacy of composition 
have an obvious intellectual lineage that can be traced to Keynes, Minsky, and others, 
who focused on how the behavioral dispositions of those trading in financial markets 
increase the likelihood of “macro-level” financial instability (Baker, 2012; Datz, 2012). 
However, there is also a less well-known intellectual genealogy of contemporary 
macroprudential debates that can be traced to the Institutional economics of Thorstein 
Veblen and John Kenneth Galbraith. In this article, we uncover these hidden intellectual 
roots, effectively tracing a century of evolving macroprudential debate. In the process, we 
also highlight key weaknesses of macroprudential regimes, as the misplaced emphases of 
Veblen and Galbraith on the technocratic role of policy ‘engineers’ or managerial 
‘technostructures’ hold relevance to theoretical debates over the limits to rationality and 
policy debates over legitimacy and effectiveness. In particular, we argue that Veblen and 
Galbraith each overlooked key ways in which intellectual refinement could paradoxically 
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impede policy legitimacy, in ways that could eventually compromise policy performance 
itself.  
In developing these themes over this paper, we first characterize the contemporary 
macroprudential project, as it envisions increased regulatory efforts to contain self-
reinforcing asset-price spirals, yet risks diminishing legitimacy given the need for 
technocratic autonomy in such efforts. To encapsulate this dilemma, we then introduce a 
psychologically-oriented constructivist analysis, one juxtaposing the popular bases of 
paradigmatic beliefs with intellectual tendencies to overconfidence that can ironically 
erode these same popular foundations. In the third and fourth sections, we apply these 
insights to historical analyses of the popular bases of Veblen’s and Galbraith’s proto-
macroprudential ideas – and their erosion, as each grew vulnerable to technocratic 
overconfidence: First, while Veblen’s arguments accorded with Progressive regulatory 
debates, his faith in technocratic possibilities – e.g., as he called for the establishment of a 
‘Soviet’ of economic ‘engineers’ – foreshadowed neglect of concerns for legitimacy and 
potential populist backlash. Second, while Institutionalist views regained influence over 
the postwar decades as Galbraith integrated them with Keynesian insights, Galbraith 
would likewise underrate concerns for legitimacy in arguing for governance by an expert 
‘technostructure’. Turning to the conclusion, we suggest that while Institutionalists 
offered important insights concerning the usefulness of regulation in the policy mix, they 
underrated the importance of legitimacy to sustaining such measures. To highlight these 
dynamics, we develop in closing Schmidt’s (2012) disaggregated notion of legitimacy, as 
she highlights the interplay of input legitimacy, based in popular values, throughput 
legitimacy, based in the openness of government, and output legitimacy, defined with 
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respect to utilitarian policy merit. Emphasizing their cumulative nature, we argue that 
where technocratic acumen obscures the need for governmental engagement, the 
consequent reductions in throughput legitimacy can feed back on economic output and 
policy performance – and so erode output legitimacy itself. More broadly, as Seabrooke 
(2006-2007) argues, we highlight the ways in which popular disengagement can give rise 
to ‘legitimacy gaps’ over time. 
 
The Current Macroprudential Project: Technocratic and Populist Bases 
 Macroprudential regulation (MPR) is a systemic approach to financial stability 
that seeks to ‘curb the credit cycle’ through countercyclical interventions involving the 
imposition of restraints on the activities of private institutions to limit asset price 
volatility – in a way that potentially stands to reduce the need for macroeconomic 
restraint. More broadly, a macroprudential approach involves treating the financial 
system as a whole, viewing risk as a systemic and endogenous property, rather than 
focusing solely on the safety and soundness of individual institutions.
2
 In this regard, 
macroprudential thinking draws on the notion of ‘fallacy of composition’ – recognizing 
that individual incentives and the courses of action that flow from these do not 
necessarily result in desirable aggregate or systemic outcomes (Borio 2011). Similarly, 
macroprudential thinking recognizes that prices in financial markets can be driven to 
extremes by a combination of procyclicality and herding behavior. Procyclicality 
involves the calculation of risk following prices, meaning that the supply of credit 
fuelling investment is most plentiful when least needed (when asset prices are rising) and 
least plentiful when most needed (when asset prices are falling) (Borio, Furfine and Lowe 
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2001, Borio and White 2004; White 2006; BIS 2006). Herding involves individuals 
deferring to the judgements of others, failing to make efficient use of information 
(Haldane 2010; 2011).  A final macroprudential concept emphasizes the complex 
interconnected nature of contemporary financial systems, (what BIS economists call the 
cross-sectional dimension (Borio, 2011,) in which, small events can trigger a much more 
severe series of chain reactions (Haldane and May, 2010).  
 To offset such tendencies, the stated objective of macroprudential policy is to 
moderate credit supply over the cycle, tightening policy in a boom and lowering it in a 
bust (Bank of England 2011). For example, the most commonly cited macroprudential 
policy instrument is the counter cyclical capital buffer, a variant of which has been in 
operation in the Spanish banking system for some time. The idea behind a counter 
cyclical capital buffer is to lean against the credit cycle based on a reference path of a 
normalised credit to GDP ratio. Deviations above the path involve a tightening of capital 
requirements for private lending institutions, while deviations below that path should 
involve a loosening of those requirements (Haldane 2012a). Other potential 
macroprudential instruments include constraints on bank leverage levels and maximum 
levels being placed on the levels of bank asset encumbrance. Finally, advocates of 
macroprudential regulation have stressed the ways in which a concentrated focus on 
limiting financial instability in a sector-specific setting can reduce the need for more 
general macroeconomic restraints – limiting the potential for the financial ‘tail’ to wag 
the real economic ‘dog’ (Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia and Mauro 2011). 
         However this stress on the scope for regulatory reach in turn has implications for 
the need for technocratic autonomy.  A macroprudential policy regime requires regulators 
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who have the technical capacity to recognize asset price bubbles through the use of 
analytical and mathematical techniques that identify deviations from normalised credit to 
GDP ratio paths. They also have to make judgments on necessary corrective actions and 
have the scope and autonomy to implement those actions. The contemporary 
macroprudential project, is to a large extent therefore, a technocratic project, designed by 
technocrats for technocrats (Engelen et al, 2010), precisely because it requires some 
degree of expansion in the powers and discretion of a new cadre of technocratic price 
engineers. The words, of the Bank of England’s director of financial stability, Andrew 
Haldane, capture the technocratic aspirations of the macroprudential project. “If there 
were a benign enlightened regulatory planner, able to redirect competitive forces, this 
could potentially avert future tragedies of the financial commons. Fortunately there is" 
(Haldane, 2012a, p.12).  Indeed, the technocratic inception and promotion of the 
macroprudential approach, would seem to accord with the frameworks developed by 
constructivists, that stress the importance of “norm entrepreneurs” who make efficient 
use of information in advancing policy change (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Baker, 
2012).  
         The term ‘macroprudential’ itself was first used by the Cooke Committee – a 
forerunner of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision BCBS – on 28-29 June 1979, 
to refer to how problems with a particular institution could have destabilising systemic 
implications (Clement 2010). Informal usage of the term continued throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s at the Basel based Bank for International Settlements (BIS), but it was after the 
Asian financial crisis that the research department at the BIS began to develop a fully 
fledged research programme and started forwarding macroprudential proposals (Borio, 
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Furfine and Lowe 2001; Borio and White 2004; White 2006; BIS 2006; Borio and 
Drehman, 2008). These efforts were also given intellectual energy and credibility by the 
work of a number of academic and private sector economists such as Martin Hellwig, 
Avinash Persaud, Charles Goodhart, Hyun Song Shin, Markus Brunnermeir and 
development economists such as Jose Ocampo and Stephanie Griffith-Jones (Hellwig 
1995; Persaud 2000; Goodhart and Segoviano 2004; Griffith, Jones and Ocampo 2006). 
Moreover, the ideational shift that followed the financial crash of 2008 largely involved 
technocrats from the BIS, together with some of the figures above and some officials 
from national central banks, exercising an ‘insiders coup d’etat’ to depose efficient 
markets orthodoxies (Turner 2011; Baker 2012).  
 Yet, even as the macroprudential ideational shift was advanced in key ways by 
technocrats, it could not have proceeded without support from G20 leaders and finance 
ministers, or without accord with broader public sentiments – in ways that go beyond a 
focus on norm entrepreneurs and technocratic contexts. Indeed, the offer of a more 
comprehensive regulatory agenda chimed with popular sentiment and the rise of populist 
politics seeking punishment for the banking sector following the crash of 2008.This 
climate created incentives for politicians to open debates about financial regulation to 
include broader social externalities (Thirkell-White 2009). Given this importance of 
popular contexts and leader support, we stress that while macroprudential regulation is a 
technocratic project, any discussion of its potential must recognize the ways in which 
technocratic insularity maybe self-limiting as it compromises popular legitimacy.  In this 
light, our basic position is that ‘we have all been here before’: Veblen and Galbraith each 
advanced arguments in favour of technocratic interventions that foreshadowed the 
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macroprudential case. To aid in structuring this argument, however, we briefly detour 
into a theoretical discussion of constructivist analyses of norm life cycles, entrepreneurs, 
and their limits.      
              
Theoretical Context: Toward a Social Psychological Constructivism 
 To address the economic merit and political tensions in Veblen and Galbraith’s 
views – as these may foreshadow macroprudential dilemmas – we advance a social 
psychological constructivist perspective, one which highlights not only the popular bases 
of paradigmatic views, but also the ironic ways in which paradigmatic refinement can 
weaken those very foundations. More formally, we make two broad assumptions: that 
shared public attachments to ethical values prefigure the paradigmatic bases of norms 
and interests, and that the repression of such paradigmatic understandings can in turn 
undermine policy legitimacy and effectiveness. Regarding the former, we build on the 
recent efforts of scholars who have argued that emotional or affective contexts prefigure 
more refined cognitive attachments, in ways that can help to enable the rise of specific 
norm entrepreneurs (Crawford  2000; Ross 2006). For example, from this vantage, the 
more egalitarian everyday values of the 1940s legitimated Keynesian ideas and imbued 
them with a self-reinforcing momentum. Likewise, the more libertarian values of the 
1970s undermined the legitimacy of Keynesian policies in ways that presaged a Classical 
shift. Most recently, as we suggested above, the rise of macroprudential thinking also 
took place in a context in which public anger at banks surged (Thirkell-White 2009). 
Regarding the latter, we further assume that policy intellectuals may act over time less as 
efficient “norm entrepreneurs” than as inefficient agents who refrain from updating their 
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beliefs in ways that impede policy efficiency. These tendencies arise as agents engage in 
the unconscious ‘intellectual repression’ of everyday values, and so fail to modify their 
beliefs (Kaplan, 1957). An example of such a phenomenon can be found in the 
inefficiencies of Keynesian intellectuals in the 1970s, as they failed to recognize shifts in 
public attitudes regarding the legitimacy of fiscal restraint or wage and price controls. 
Similarly, one might highlight the failures of Classical economists in the 2000s, as they 
overlooked the declining effectiveness of rules governing competition at containing the 
concentration of financial power – giving rise to an inefficient, unsustainable and 
pathological allocation of credit in contravention of supposedly efficient markets. 
Taken together, this stress on the interplay of popular foundations and 
paradigmatic repression produces a dynamic model, in which popular values legitimate 
more refined intellectual beliefs, until the intellectual repression of such influences gives 
rise to inefficiency, overconfidence, and eventual crisis. Put differently, one might argue 
that policy development moves at ‘two speeds’: Where intellectuals resist change – as 
Daniel Kahneman (2011) puts it – they engage in ‘slow thinking’, as they fail to adapt to 
mounting pressures. In contrast, after crises, policymakers prove more flexible in 
responding to shocks – acting in ‘fast thinking’ ways which accord with rationalist 
analyses of ostensible norm entrepreneurs. Indeed it was this very process of ‘fast 
thinking’ that characterized the relatively rapid and sudden rise to prominence of the 
macroprudential frame after 2008, with changing popular sentiment reinforcing that 
momentum.  
Over the following sections, we trace the evolving views of Veblen and Galbraith, 
and demonstrate the advantages of a social psychological constructivism in stressing 
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limits to intellectual efficiency. In methodological terms, we employ an interpretive, 
broadly genealogical approach, shifting from “close” discussions of the theoretical 
discourses of Veblen and Galbraith to more “distant” discussions of their instantiation in 
Progressive and Keynesian policies (Gibbons, 1987). In the process, we demonstrate two 
parallel tendencies, as Veblen and Galbraith each: 1) initially accorded with the 
essentially macroprudential Progressive and Keynesian debates of their days; but 
subsequently, 2) evinced increasing intellectual tendencies toward teleological, 
ahistorical models – seen in Veblen’s overconfidence in regulatory ‘engineers’ and 
Galbraith’s stress on the rise of a ‘New Class’ and managerial ‘technostructure’. In 
broader terms, this analysis may be seen as according with a Deweyan pragmatism, one 
which recognizes the dynamic nature of expectations and the inevitable limits to any 
technocratic framework (Widmaier 2004). Given these parallel trends, we suggest in the 
conclusion that the challenge for IPE theory is to better understand the limits to 
intellectual rationality, and that the challenge for macroprudential regulation is to 
recognize that technocratic refinement may exist in tension with popular legitimacy – and 
even, after a time, policy effectiveness.  
 
Veblen and the Institutionalist Bases of Progressivism 
In developing the foundations of Institutionalist economics, Thorstein Veblem 
placed a recurring stress on the social bases of consumer, industrial, and regulatory 
interests (Hodgson 1998). From this vantage, – and in a way that accords with the 
concern of contemporary advocates of macroprudential regulation with procyclicality and 
herding  – neither wage, nor price, nor share value increases can be reduced to 
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macroeconomic aggregates, but can themselves reflect concentrations of market power 
and prevailing social moods. Resulting price irregularities are therefore seen to require 
more formal controls. In Progressive-era U.S., this justified a focus on structural 
developments like the rise of the modern corporation, monopolistic competition, and the 
separation of ownership from control – trends which together highlighted the need for 
regulatory efforts. Yet, the evolution of Institutional ideas and regulatory reach would not 
be unidirectional: By the end of World War I, even as Veblen developed more ambitious 
arguments for regulation by ‘engineers’, a popular backlash would commence and restrict 
the scope for policy over the next decade to monetary efforts – in a way that served to 
accelerate the market boom and presaged the eventual Great Crash. In this way, while 
Veblen’s analyses initially accorded with Progressive-era views, the increasing 
intellectualization of his work led his work to grow at odds with prevailing debate – a 
potential pitfall for any contemporary macroprudential project. 
 
Veblen on the Social Bases of Consumption, Industry and Management  
In applied terms, Veblen (1898: 392-393; 1899; 93) argued that economic 
analysis must address ‘the entire organic complex of habits of thought that have been 
shaped by past practices’ to acknowledge the importance of ‘institutions [and]… habits of 
thought’. This broad view would guide his work over the first two decades of the 
twentieth century, from early efforts like Theory of the Leisure Class, which highlighted 
the social bases of consumption, through Theory of Business Enterprise, which similarly 
addressed the social bases of corporate interests, to his Engineers and the Price System, 
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which highlighted the possibilities for technocratic government to limit social and 
corporate excesses.     
       Theory of the Leisure Class remains Veblen’s most-well-known effort. In part this 
was an analysis of the social bases of consumer excesses, with Veblen attacking 
assumptions regarding consumer sovereignty which stood at the heart of Classical 
frameworks. Veblen (1909:629) urged a greater recognition of the ‘wants and desires 
[that shape an] individual’s conduct [and] are functions of an institutional variable that is 
of a highly complex and wholly unstable character’. Veblen condemned elites engaged in 
‘conspicuous consumption’ – or wasteful consumption and a deliberately idle lifestyle 
not out of any desire for utility, but rather to advance their social standing. This broad 
emphasis on the social construction of wants would foreshadow later criticisms of abuses 
of market power in the construction of private rather needs and monopolistic pricing. 
In his later Theory of Business Enterprise, Veblen moved to apply this socialized 
analysis to an earlier point in the production chain, addressing the sources of corporate 
interests. In this regard, Veblen accorded with the Progressive dispositions of the day in 
stressing the importance of large organizations possessing market power. Highlighting 
the monopoly power enjoyed by industrialists and financiers, Veblen (1904: 2) argued 
that ‘the business man… has become a controlling force in industry [and]…controls the 
exigencies of life under which the community lives’. Focusing on the implications for 
monopolistic prices, Veblen (1904:16) elaborated that the ‘principle which guides 
producers and merchants… in fixing the[ir] prices… is… known in the language of the 
railroads as “charging what the traffic will bear”.’ However, Veblen went beyond noting 
increases in deadweight losses imposed upon society, to highlight an intellectual division 
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of labor in which owners and ‘captains of industry’ found it increasingly difficult to 
comprehend the complexities of monopoly pricing. In such contexts, power in firms 
would shift from the owners of large firms to the ‘engineers’ who actually administered 
prices to maximize revenues – setting the stage for a potential emergence of tensions 
because the owners and managers of the modern corporation, with potential implications 
for regulatory efforts.  
 In Engineers and the Price System, Veblen again extended these themes to 
highlight potential social bases of regulatory interests – and the potential for a 
technocratic rebellion. In the process, he began by offering an expanded theory of 
industrial ‘sabotage’, stressing the wasteful tendencies of corporate owners and 
managers. Traditionally, Veblen (1921: 5-7) argued, the notion of sabotage had been 
applied to laborers who ‘resorted to such measures to secure improved conditions of 
work, or increased wages’. Yet, while often associated in a pejorative sense with strikes, 
Veblen argued that the term could be used to ‘describe any manoeuvre of slowing-down, 
inefficiency, bungling, obstruction’. In this light, he highlighted tendencies to 
monopolistic sabotage, which entailed the ‘delay and obstruction of industry’ to ‘maintain 
prices at a reasonably profitable level’. Given the rise of large corporations, Veblen 
(1921: 25; 34) argued that ‘enterprise may fairly be said to have shifted from the footing 
of free-swung competitive production to that of a “conscientious withholding of 
efficiency”.’ Instead, the conscientious withholding of efficiency had come to require a 
degree of skill which exceeded entrepreneurs and businessmen, requiring ‘systematic 
control under the direction of… “production engineers”.’  
 Perhaps influenced by Wilsonian World War I-era idealism, Veblen then 
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advanced a more explicit, if not teleological theory of how conflict between absentee 
owners or businessmen and engineers might be resolved. It would, he argued, reflect the 
emergence of a new kind of sabotage not by business, labor or the state, but by the 
technical elite itself, as it recognized the costs of absentee ownership for output and 
efficiency. In this context, Veblen (1921: 102-103) argued that the engineers would ‘draw 
together… and decide to disallow absentee ownership” through their own “ conscientious 
withdrawal of efficiency’ and so set off a ‘general strike, to include so much of the 
country's staff of technicians as will suffice to incapacitate the industrial system’. Having 
taken control of the industrial machine, they would then ostensibly run it more 
effectively.  
 While this faith in expert management reflected the basic ethos underlying the 
Progressive movement, Veblen’s early-1920s analyses in Engineers and the Price System 
stood at odds with the direction of prevailing sentiments, as Wilsonian idealism and 
efforts at reform had foundered in the postwar context. Indeed, the atmosphere of the 
Palmer raids and postwar red scare spoke to the reemergence of Hofstadter-styled anti-
intellectualism – and the reformist impulses of the past two decades would dissipate in 
the context of a more limited focus on monetary policy. 
 
Veblen, Progressivism and the Limits to Reform 
To make sense of these latent limitations of regulation requires situating Veblen’s 
analyses in a sense of the rise and demise of Progressive-era politics. In a broad sense the 
Long Depression of the 1870s to the 1890s gave rise to the Populist monetary politics of 
the 1890s, which culminated in the 1896 defeat of the ‘free silver’ campaign of 
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Democratic candidate William Jennings Bryan. However, the reduction in concerns for 
deflation did not amount to a cessation of concern for financial instability, and so the 
agrarian stress on monetary politics yielded, with the rise of Theodore Roosevelt to the 
Presidency, to a Progressive movement focused on reform and regulation. Over the 
Roosevelt administration, efforts to limit corporate abuses of market power gave rise to 
new efforts at centralized wage bargaining and price control, to limit Veblen styled 
corporate and labor sabotage. To be sure, Roosevelt’s aggressive approach to regulation – 
later termed the “New Nationalism” – was not the only variety of Progressivism. By 
1912, in the three-way campaign that pitted Roosevelt, William Howard Taft and 
Woodrow Wilson against one another, Roosevelt’s New Nationalism would be pitted 
against a Wilsonian ‘New Freedom’ which stressed the need for antitrust and 
liberalization.  
Nevertheless, regulatory efforts increased in importance over the Wilson 
administration. Having secured passage of the Federal Reserve Act of 1913 – which 
made monetary policy possible in establishing a central banking system – and the 
Revenue Act of 1913 – which made fiscal policy possible in a progressive income tax –
war would push Wilson even further towards a Rooseveltian stance. Even prior to U.S. 
entry, Wilson would establish public-private hybrid agencies in the War Industries Board, 
Price Fixing Committee, and Food and Fuel Administrations (Rockoff 1984: 43). These 
were designed with an eye to limiting the effects of wartime mobilization on prices. 
Working with a combination of direct legal sanction, fiscal restraint and moral suasion, 
they served to keep inflation in check, and reinforced Veblen’s insights regarding the 
interplay of monopoly power and price control – as Frank Taussig (1919: 217), the Price-
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Fixing Committee’s chief economist noted in citing the stabilization of nickel prices – 
where the American Nickel Company stood as ‘a single producer, in possession of a 
complete monopoly’.  
Yet, the move toward increasing regulation would be slowed as what had been 
acceptable during the conflict would be viewed more skeptically in the context of 
postwar conversion. The end of the war spurred a backlash against crusading idealism 
across a variety of contexts, and so Veblen’s support for governance by technocratic 
engineers would be undermined by the postwar emergence of a populist anti-
intellectualism. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1957: 43-44) described this broader backlash, 
‘war had destroyed progressivism’ and intellectuals now found themselves ‘persecuted by 
the state’  and if  ‘but a few had actual indictments hanging over them, all felt a sentence 
suspended over their enthusiasms, their beliefs, their innermost thoughts’. Over the next 
decade, regulatory instruments would be dismantled and Treasury Secretary Andrew 
Mellon’s fiscal policy would be frozen in an expansionary stance, shrinking the scope for 
economic policy to monetary fine tuning. The abrupt nature of this retreat can be seen 
most clearly in the scuttling of the Commerce Department’s Industrial Board, which was 
briefly set up in early 1919 to enable industry coordination in limiting the deflationary 
consequences of demobilization. Had industrial actors and Veblen-styled engineers been 
permitted to collude, this might have reduced the need for the Federal Reserve’s postwar 
monetary tightening. However, the Commerce Board would almost immediately be 
dismantled, as the early postwar crusading spirit had yielded by May 1919 an aversion to 
regulation and revived faith in a New Freedom-styled stress on antitrust efforts and 
competition. 
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Over the 1920s, opposition to regulation – in a context of intellectual retreat and 
populist appeals to what Herbert Hoover termed a ‘rugged individualism’ – left monetary 
policy the sole means to economic stability. Where regulatory initiatives were attempted, 
they were often quickly rebuffed. For example, to reconcile tensions between real 
economic growth and asset price stability, the Federal Reserve in February 1929 briefly 
sought a limited regulation as it applied moral suasion in a statement asserting that ‘a 
member bank is not within its reasonable claims for rediscount facilities… when it 
borrows… for the purpose of making speculative loans’ (Galbraith 1954:33). While in 
the immediate context, this statement was followed by halt in the boom, by late March 
the National City Bank would issue $200 million in call market credit, preempting any 
regulatory revival. The effectiveness of direct pressure remains subject to debate, with 
monetarists like Friedman and Schwartz (1963) casting it as irrelevant, while Galbraith 
(1954) and Bernanke (2012a) suggesting that such efforts provide a useful first line of 
defense.   
In this sense, Veblen’s rising enthusiasm for regulatory initiatives from Theory of 
the Leisure Class to Engineers and the Price System ran counter to the direction of public 
sentiment. However, Veblen was not entirely unaware of these dynamics, noting a 
Hofstadter-styled anti-intellectual dynamic. Veblen (1921: 93) observed that the public 
often exhibited a ‘sentimental deference… to the sagacity of its business men’ and 
warned that ‘popular sentiment in this country will not tolerate the assumption of 
responsibility by the technicians, who are in popular apprehension conceived to be a 
somewhat fantastic brotherhood of over-specialized cranks, not to be trusted out of sight 
except under the restraining hand of safe and sane business men’. Veblen so recognized – 
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in the abstract, and in a somewhat-condescending manner – that without widespread 
public legitimacy, technocratic regulators who owe their authority to their expertise, but 
have not bothered to build and nurture constituencies of support amongst the wider 
public, could find themselves in vulnerable and precarious positions. Such dynamics 
would in turn be evident in the evolution of Veblen’s successors like Galbraith, who 
would build on Institutionalism to provide a regulatory basis for a Keynesian policy mix 
of regulation and macroeconomic fine tuning. Yet, even as this approach would produce 
prolonged postwar success in sustaining growth and limiting inflation, it would 
eventually confront diminishing popular support. Over time, as public skepticism in calls 
for wage and price restraint fed back on their effectiveness, no amount of technocratic 
sophistication could legitimate restraint.  
 
Galbraith and the Institutionalist Context of the Keynesian Order 
Over the decades following the Great Depression, John Kenneth Galbraith would 
integrate insights from American Institutionalism with the more macroeconomic insights 
of John Maynard Keynes in a way that laid the foundations for a postwar regulatory-
macroeconomic ‘policy mix’. This policy mix anticipated later aspects of 
macroprudentialism in its use of wage and price guidelines to address the institutional 
bases of the wage-price (in lieu of the asset-price) spiral, in a way that would increase the 
scope for monetary or fiscal expansion. Over the postwar decades, Galbraith (1958; 1967; 
1973) would advance such arguments not so much as an academic economist but as a 
policy adviser to Presidents Roosevelt, Kennedy and Johnson and as a public intellectual 
in works like The Affluent Society, The New Industrial State, and Economics and the 
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Public Purpose. Yet, like Veblen, Galbraith did at times err in the direction of theoretical 
over-exuberance – as he overlooked the ways in which his elite ‘technostructure’ might 
fail to adapt to shifting public expectations – and by the end of the 1970s, found himself 
at odds with popular support for deregulatory initiatives.  
 
 Galbraith and the Institutional-Keynesian Consensus 
To make sense of this evolution, it is necessary to highlight the theoretical, if not 
epistemological, accord between Institutionalist and Keynesian ideas. Paralleling Veblen, 
Keynes (1936; 1937, 113-114) stressed the intersubjective influences on state and market 
agents. Rejecting the view of markets as efficient in the use of information, similar to the 
contemporary macroprudential case, he argued that the Classical theory ‘assumes that we 
have a knowledge of the future of a kind quite different from that which we actually 
possess’ and leads economists to downplay the weight of uncertainty in shaping agents’ 
choices. Rather than viewing uncertainty as a form of subjective doubt or as merely 
distinguishing ‘what is known for certain from what is only probable,’ Keynes argued 
that uncertainty pertained to matters about which ‘there is no scientific basis on which to 
form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know.’ To limit its effects, 
he accordingly stressed the importance of prevailing intersubjective conventions. 
Economic agents would follow social trends, looking to collectively formed 
understandings for guidance. They would ‘endeavor to conform with the behaviour of the 
majority or the average’, leading to ‘what we may strictly term a conventional judgment’. 
Such conventions might themselves influence ‘real’ fundamentals, as self-fulfilling 
depression spurred downwards economic spirals and self-reinforcing wage-price spirals 
 19 
could give rise to accelerating inflation. These observations are mirrored by references to 
herding in contemporary macroprudential thinking, as a consequence of myopic and less 
than rational agents, further amplifying the procyclicality of credit and financial markets 
(Turner 2011; Tucker 2011). In the early wartime context, Keynes (1941:423-425) 
stressed the need to stabilize inflationary expectations, arguing that ‘some measure of 
rationing and price control’ would be needed to prevent ‘wages and prices chasing one 
another upwards’.  
Yet, to the extent that Keynes never developed an argument for efforts to stabilize 
the conventional bases of inflationary expectations at any great length, this strand of 
argument would be taken up by Galbraith – as an economist and policymaker, playing a 
key policy role as head of the Price Division at the Office of Price Administration (OPA). 
Galbraith (1941: 83-84) explicitly stressed the macroeconomic purpose of wage-price 
regulation in the wider policy mix, warning that if fiscal or monetary policy were used to 
limit inflation, they would impede the growth necessary to fuel the exigencies of wartime 
mobilization. Wage-price guidelines would be needed not simply for price stabilization, 
but to reconcile stabilization with full employment: 
 
That inflation can be checked by a sufficient over-all 
reduction of expenditures is not in doubt; but this measure 
has the crudity in application of any general or blanket 
measure.  Further, if it is applied too soon it will check 
inflation by checking the whole expansion process 
(emphasis added). 
 
To be sure, his thinking would also evolve over the course of the conflict. 
Initially, Galbraith favored a sector-by-sector approach to price control – hewing in effect 
to a more technocratic than a democratic approach. However, by early 1942, the OPA 
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would find the complexity of enforcement to be overwhelming. Recognizing the need for 
a comprehensive approach, Galbraith and the Roosevelt administration accordingly 
shifted to a systemic guideline in its ‘General Maximum Price Regulation’ of 1942. This 
placed an over-all ceiling on all U.S. prices, providing a universal convention that 
policymakers could then modify in sector-specific settings as necessary. In the aftermath 
of the conflict, Galbraith would go further than Keynes in stressing the importance of 
both market structure and everyday sentiment to price control. Regarding the former, 
Galbraith (1952: 17) argued in his academic monograph Theory of Price Control that ‘it 
is relatively easy to fix prices that are already fixed’. Regarding the latter, Galbraith 
(1946: 481) argued that ‘a community that has come to regard war as a tragedy 
stigmatizes illegal profiteering’. In this way, price control was recognized to be an 
explicitly political activity, requiring the coordination of expectations. 
Moving out of the wartime context, Galbraith returned to academia, where he 
paralleled Veblen’s stance as a public intellectual and most prominently synthesized 
Institutionalist and Keynesian insights in his 1958 effort, The Affluent Society. Issued in 
the context of the sputnik launch and concerns for the health of American society, the 
Affluent Society merged Veblen-styled social criticism and concerns for monopoly power 
in the context of a Keynes concern for macroeconomic policy. Echoing Keynes’ view of 
conventions, Galbraith (1958-6-7) coined the notion of the ‘conventional wisdom’, or 
ideas that enjoyed success not on their merits, but on the basis of familiarity and 
acceptability. In the economic context, Galbraith went on to critique the prevailing 
conventional wisdom for casting the economy as dominated by a large number of small 
firms lacking control over prices or tastes. Countering this view, Galbraith (1958:85-86) 
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first highlighted the dominance of those large firms which acted to reduce uncertainty 
and competition. Likewise, taking issue with the notion of consumer sovereignty, 
Galbraith stressed the weight of a ‘dependence effect’, through which large firms making 
use of advertising to spur tendencies to emulation could effectively create new private 
wants. Highlighting the paradoxical consequences, Galbraith (1958:158) argued that 
higher levels of production would simply lead to a ‘higher level of want creation [in 
turn,] necessitating a higher level of want satisfaction’. Perhaps more importantly, he 
highlighted the adverse implications for the extent of ‘social balance’, as excessive 
concern for private wants risked a corresponding neglect of the public good.  
Having characterized and criticized the prevailing conventional wisdom, 
Galbraith moved to advance a series of more specific policy critiques and sociological 
propositions. First, Galbraith (1958: 195) stressed the influence of the conventional 
wisdom on economists’ beliefs, highlighting the success of ‘Social Darwinists and the 
utilitarian philosophers’ in identifying ‘vitality and liberty with the free market’, ensuring 
that regulation and control ‘will be regarded as an even more far-reaching menace’. This, 
he argued, led to a preoccupation of macroeconomic policy instruments in stabilizing 
inflation, despite the costs of fiscal or monetary restraint for growth. Just as he had 
argued in 1941, Galbraith stressed the danger of reliance on macroeconomic restraint 
where firms possessing market power might sustain high prices in the face of weakening 
demand – necessitating a redoubling of restraint. Instead, Galbraith (1958: 194) 
advocated a policy mix that would ‘combine fiscal policy with control over prices and 
wages’. From this vantage, wage and price guidelines might serve as the optimal means 
to forestalling wage-price spirals. Even given tight labor markets, if labor could recognize 
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shared interests in private restraint, it might refrain from the full use of its market power, 
easing pressures on firms to raise prices. It is worth at this point stressing the Galbraithian 
accord with macroprudential thinking: Efforts to adjust wage and price guidelines 
resonate with macroprudentialists who advocate tightening capital requirement when 
asset price growth is seen to be excessive, or a loosening of cushions when credit 
conditions deteriorate. If wage-price pressures and modern financial markets left to their 
own devices gravitate towards excesses and procyclicality, which Galbraith and 
macroprudentialists each view as possible, then price controllers could mitigate this by 
catalysing and injecting countercyclicality into the system. 
In such analyses, much of the Affluent Society contained an essentially pragmatic 
approach to economic policymaking – one which recognized the variable nature of 
everyday expectations and the need for policymakers to maintain a degree of connection 
with the wider public (Widmaier 2004). However, in some tension with his open-ended 
pragmatism, Galbraith then moved to advance a more teleological argument positing the 
expansion of a sense of the public interest. He suggested –in a manner that echoed 
Veblen’s stress on the role of engineers – that affluence would over time make possible 
the rise of a ‘New Class’ of educated professionals. Galbraith (1958: 258) argued that 
social attitudes had changed in the U.S to the point that ‘the leisure class, at least as an 
easily identifiable phenomenon, has disappeared. To be idle is no longer considered 
rewarding or even entirely respectable’. More broadly, Galbraith argued that the pursuit 
of educational opportunity in the New Class might facilitate a broadened appreciation of 
the scope for the public interest – much as Veblen’s engineers had been seen as 
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harbingers of a more enlightened price system, albeit on a much broader scale, also 
chiming with Haldane’s current calls for benign, enlightened, regulatory planners. 
 In his 1967 effort The New Industrial State, and into his more policy focused 
1973 effort on  Economics and the Public Purpose, Galbraith built on his analysis in The 
Affluent Society, arguing that the imperatives of planning had given rise to a 
‘technostructure’ made up of the managerial elite, and supported by the state, an 
‘educational and scientific estate’ spanning civil society and the leading research 
universities. This posed an increasing challenge for advocates of the free market 
conventional wisdom and foreshadowed an increasing reliance on planning in lieu of the 
market.  By the late 1970s, Galbraith (1977:189-190) would assemble ‘an integrated view 
of… the structure of modern economic society’ in which he cast the economy as ‘a 
double or bimodal system’ marked by a division between the ‘market system’ and the 
‘planning system’ which had given rise to new instabilities.  
 Viewing the planning system and the market system in tandem, Galbraith (1977: 
191) stressed the planning system’s ‘concentration of market and political power’ and its 
dilution of entrepreneurial and individual power. Regarding its concentration of power, 
he argued that the large corporation possessed extensive influence over its prices and 
over its costs, could finance itself from earnings, shape consumer tastes, and benefit from 
an early form of ‘too big to fail’ relationship with the state. As Galbraith put it, ‘the 
government is the safety net into which the firm falls in the event of failure. Above a 
certain size… a corporation cannot be allowed to go out of business’. Regarding its 
tendency to diffusion, Galbraith (1977: 192-193) echoed Veblen as he argued that the 
complexity of corporate activities compelled delegation and the emergence of ‘shared 
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responsibility of specialists-engineers, scientists, production men, marketing men, 
lawyers, accountants, tax specialists [making up] the technostructure’. Galbraith then 
juxtaposed the rising power of the planning sector against the weakness of the market 
sector, where firms had no control over costs or consumers.  
 Given this asymmetry, Galbraith (1977: 194-195) argued it explained stagflation, 
as it would produce a ‘persistent tendency for severe unemployment… to be combined 
with severe inflation’. This was so because the planning sector held ‘the power to 
maintain its prices’ and even if labor pressed for higher wages, large firms could in 
tandem pass these costs on to consumers. Galbraith (1977: 196-197) accordingly 
concluded that ‘there remains only one alternative: to restrain incomes and prices not by 
unemployment but by direct intervention, by an incomes and price policy’. In its absence, 
inflation could not be arrested ‘by fiscal and monetary policy alone unless there is 
willingness to accept a very large amount of unemployment’. With the breakdown of the 
postwar support for regulation in the 1970s, Galbraith’s analysis on this last point would 
prove more right than he could have appreciated, as the Federal Reserve’s late-1979 
imposition of unprecedented monetary restraint would in the early 1980s use the 
imposition of unprecedented unemployment to wipe out the inflationary expectations. In 
this way, the policy utility of Galbraithian arguments for regulation had been undermined 
by a shift in public sentiments – a development better understood by briefly and more 
explicitly engaging the wider context of postwar economic debate. 
  
 Galbraith, Institutional Keynesianism and the Limits to Reform 
 While Galbraith began the Keynesian era articulating a broad vision for a 
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regulatory-macroeconomic policy mix, this vision would be undermined over time as it 
proved at odds with populist sentiment. As noted above, societal experiences with the 
OPA during World War II had done much to demonstrate the merit of wage and price 
controls. More importantly, they had demonstrated the potential for regulatory 
contributions to the policy mix, as controls could hold down inflationary pressures in 
ways that might increase the scope for greater growth. To be sure, the wartime experience 
had also been seen by some a unique one. Even as it demonstrated the scope for 
emergency controls, many viewed such efforts as ‘drastic measures’ and abridgements of 
economic liberties that should be removed with the return to a peacetime footing 
(Rockoff 1984). In this light, the early peacetime period is significant in that it was 
marked by a return to support for regulation in the ostensibly ‘liberal market economy’ of 
the U.S.  
 Ironically, over the postwar era, it would not be Republican economists but 
Democratic policy makers would undermine this scope for regulation: Over the 1960s, 
the Phillips Curve framework reshaped the terms of debate, with Kennedy advocates of a 
‘Neoclassical Synthesis’ of Classical and Keynesian views stressing the scope for fiscal 
fine tuning of an inflation-unemployment trade-off (Samuelson and Solow 1960). 
Through the Kennedy-Johnson administrations, Galbraith would fight a rearguard 
defense against such views, with diminishing effectiveness. Indeed, the Nixon 
administration would eventually go further than the Kennedy economists in employing 
not simply voluntary guidelines, but mandatory controls. However, speaking to the 
importance of legitimacy, the Nixon economists did so in an erratic way, moving through 
four “Phases” of controls over the 1971-1974 period, engaging in a back-and-forth that 
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exhausted public patience. In this context, public support for incomes policies of any sort 
would decline over the decade, with government spending and monetary irresponsibility 
increasingly constructed as having caused stagflation (Friedman 1968).  
 Interestingly, in making sense of the diminishing successes of Neoclassical fiscal 
Keynesianism, Galbraith recognized the limits to technocratic governance. In particular, 
he stressed the importance of ‘the fatal inelasticity of the Keynesian system’. From this 
perspective, taxes could be much more easily lowered than they could be raised. Looking 
back, Galbraith (1975: 276) argued that over the 1960s, ‘expenditures ceased to be 
subject to reduction’, elaborating: 
 
If expenditures can be increased but cannot be reduced 
and taxes can be reduced but cannot be increased, fiscal 
policy becomes, obviously, a one-way street. It will 
work wonderfully against deflation and depression but 
not very well against inflation. The Keynesian system 
had always been more inflexible than its proponents 
imagined. 
 
Yet, even as he stressed the limits to political support for fiscal policy, Galbraith 
underestimated the similar opposition to incomes policies – which by the late 1970s 
would be opposed not only by capital, but also labor, as the AFL-CIO opposed a final 
Carter administration attempt to employ ‘Tax based incomes policies’ in 1978 (Lerner 
1977; 1978). Signaling the popular extent of this broader shift, Ronald Reagan (1981) 
would argue that ‘government is not the solution to our problem; government is the 
problem’ and offered an anti-government populism in denouncing ‘government by an 
elite group’.  
 Over the ensuing decades, the policy consensus would hold that regulation and 
control could only distort the workings of the price system. By the early twenty-first 
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century, even prudential regulations had eroded, laying the foundation for the subprime 
boom that preceded the Global Financial Crisis – and revival of macroprudential themes 
described above. In these contemporary debates, macroprudential policymakers can be 
seen as building on a century of de facto macroprudential debate – extending the insights 
of Veblen and Galbraith regarding regulatory efforts to contain the institutional bases of 
monetary and/or financial instability. However, a key challenge – in attaining and 
sustaining the legitimacy of the macroprudential project – will also pertain to their ability 
to avoid the pitfalls encountered by Veblen and Galbraith, so that a focus on technocratic 
possibilities does not blind them to the importance of legitimacy. 
  
Conclusions: Theoretical, Historical and Practical Implications 
This analysis has implications for theoretical, historical and policy debates. First, 
in theoretical terms, it highlights the importance of popular legitimacy to paradigmatic 
beliefs, in ways that counter elite-centered constructivist analyses which posit the 
existence of self-sustaining ‘norm life cycles’ (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). More 
specifically, it highlights the ways in which different types of legitimacy – based in 
popular consent, institutional openness, and policy outputs – are interdependent, and so 
the legitimacy of any technocratic policy norms is contingent on evolving values and 
institutional arrangements (Schmidt 2012). Secondly, in historical terms, this analysis 
highlights the popular sources of shifts in macroprudential legitimacy over the past 
century, as the ideas espoused by Veblen and Galbraith were at first grounded in shared 
values, but later obscured by technocratic consensus which impeded efficiency in the use 
of information and so provided an endogenous contribution to eventual crises. Finally, 
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with respect to contemporary debates, this analysis highlights not only the ways in which 
the Global Financial Crisis provided a populist foundation for macroprudential 
legitimacy, but also the potential for ongoing debates over the Global Financial Crisis to 
shift in ways which pose a challenge to macroprudential advocates, lest they retreat to far 
into technocratic abstraction.  
Consider first these theoretical implications of this social psychological 
constructivism, as it has highlighted the ways in which shared values and opportunities 
for deliberation may feed back on utilitarian performance itself.  In making sense of such 
possibilities, one might disaggregate notions of legitimacy in a manner akin to that of 
Schmidt (2012: 7), who distinguishes notions of ‘input legitimacy’, which pertains to 
popular values, ‘throughput legitimacy’, which pertains to the accountability and 
inclusiveness of governing processes, and ‘output legitimacy’, which reflects the more 
utilitarian performance of any policy regime. To the extent that asset-price trends are not 
mere functions of set ratios between growth, macroeconomic variables or any 
econometric relations, but are instead functions of evolving expectations, the failure to 
engage popular conventions may deprive elites of an understanding of popular views, and 
impede their ‘throughput’ ability to modify regulatory measures. These failures may 
eventually compromise the utilitarian effectiveness of their paradigmatic assumptions 
themselves, presaging policy error and crisis. This analysis is paralleled by that offered 
more broadly by Leonard Seabrooke (2007: 258), who posits that a ‘legitimacy gap’ 
occurs when the claims made by an institution or organization with a specific policy 
function are rejected in the expressive practices of those being governed, resulting in a 
gap between claims and acts. As we have seen technocratic forms of governance are 
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vulnerable to legitimacy gaps, because insulated technocrats become convinced of the 
correctness of their own prescriptions (and so grow over confident) and can become 
divorced from popular sentiments, which can simultaneously undermine the effectiveness 
of their technical policy prescriptions. Avoiding such pitfalls, requires constant vigilance 
on the behalf of technocratic regulators in relation to how their policies map onto wider 
public moods and concerns.  
Secondly, in historical terms, we have outlined how these dynamics contributed to 
Progressive- and Keynesian-era policy shifts. Initially, economists like Veblen and 
Galbraith initially offered key insights into regulatory policy possibilities – in ways that 
corresponded to the broader ethos of the Progressive and ‘embedded liberal’ eras. 
However, to the extent that each failed to recognize shifts in popular sentiment, they each 
would over their careers insist on the increasingly technocratic application of regulatory 
frameworks, underrating the importance of popular engagement and legitimacy. For 
example, Veblen saw an increasing scope for the activities of financial engineers in the 
1920s, while Galbraith failed to anticipate the diminished support for incomes policies – 
even on the part of labor – by the late 1970s. Taken together, each failed to recognize the 
tensions between technocratic refinement and policy legitimacy. To be certain, 
restraining the market power of finance in the 1920s and labor in the 1970s might have 
been beyond the reach of regulatory solutions. Yet, any regulatory efforts would have 
likely been more successful in each period had they admitted public ‘input’ and 
institutional ‘throughput’, rather than relying primarily on macroeconomic criteria in 
governing controls.   
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Finally, such insights have relevance to ongoing policy debates, as we have 
suggested that Veblen’s and Galbraith’s Institutionalisms can be seen as antecedents to 
contemporary macroprudentialists. Indeed, as noted above, a post-Global Financial Crisis 
enthusiasm for regulation provided key popular foundations for macroprudentialism 
(Thirkell-White 2009). Yet, our analysis suggests that advocates of stronger 
macroprudential positions will not themselves ultimately triumph unless they are able to 
balance claims for technocratic expertise with an engagement with popular sentiment. 
Interestingly, there are early signs that some key advocates of macroprudential regulation 
appreciate this dynamic. For example, Andrew Haldane (2012b: 10) has not only argued 
that we may be in the early stages of a reformation of finance, but also credited the 
Occupy Movement with having ‘helped stir’ these changed in making arguments that 
‘have helped win the debate’.  Moreover, Haldane has also recognized that technocratic 
policy makers will need their ‘continuing support in delivering radical change’. In this 
light, we conclude that intellectual and technocratic arguments are always endogenous to 
broader popular values, and so – where economic policymakers lose sight of such 
constraints – a Seabrooke-styled (2006; 2007) technocratic ‘legitimacy gap’ can 
undermine popular support and policy effectiveness. 
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1
 
As a specific term of art, “macroprudential regulation” in contemporary debate refers to regulatory efforts 
designed to prevent private investment choices from threatening systemic instability. While the precise 
term “macroprudential” was not used in the Progressive or Post-World War II eras, the underlying belief 
that private wage, price or investment choices could cause system-wide disruptions legitimated regulatory 
efforts in each era. In this sense, macroprudential concerns – for imprudent choices that threaten 
macroeconomic destabilization – havean enduring pedigree, which we trace in this paper. 
2
 To be sure, the scope for macroprudential regulation remains contested, as U.S. policymakers like Ben 
Bernanke (2010) take a more minimalist view that aligns macroprudential regulation with notions of micro-
level supervision and monitoring. 
